The Crisis in Ukraine:
Implications at Home and Abroad

​​Samuel Charap, PhDSenior Political Scientist
RAND Corporation

 

The immediate past and potential future scenarios for the Russia-Ukraine War were discussed by Samuel Charap, PhD, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He reviewed the reasons why Russia initiated its war of aggression against Ukraine and why Russia’s early initiatives faltered. He assessed the Western response to the invasion and provided a variety of potential outcomes for the war.

A Brief History of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Dr. Charap pointed out that the underlying factors precipitating the conflict can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse. However, 2014 marked a watershed moment, when relatively Russia friendly President Viktor Yanukovych rejected the option for greater integration with the European Union. This led to uprisings against his democratically elected but authoritarian regime that were violently suppressed. However, the anti-government protests ultimately toppled the government, forcing the President to flee and enabling the transition to a Russia-skeptical, Western-leaning government.

In an attempt to ensure its influence over Ukraine, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and supported pro-Russia separatist rebels who began seizing territory in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Fighting between the rebels and the Ukrainian military intensified, the rebels started losing, and, in August 2014, the Russian army overtly invaded eastern Ukraine to support the rebels.

The Minsk Agreements of 2014 and 2015 sought to end the conflict. Under the agreements, Russia would return control of the Donbas region to Ukraine in exchange for levers of influence over Ukraine’s future. The agreements were never realized. By 2021, Moscow had lost any prospect of achieving its objectives through the Minsk process.

Recent Developments

By late Fall 2021, 150,000 Russian troops amassed on the Ukrainian border. But Russian planning was being conducted in secret by a few of Putin’s advisors. Even the Russian troops and their leaders believed this was to be a military exercise until orders to invade were issued, and a chaotic Russian invasion began. Despite Russia’s military advantage, they did not effectively execute a coherent strategy, allowing Ukraine troops to score significant early victories.

The Ukraine military and civilian resistance were more resilient than Russian intelligence had presumed. Based on flawed assumptions, Putin’s advisors anticipated that a war against Ukraine could be won in 3 days, that the Ukraine army and the government leaders would flee, and that Russian soldiers would be “greeted with flowers.” The Kremlin justified its decision to launch the war — which it calls a “special military operation” — by saying it was protecting Russian speakers who live in the Donbas region from “genocide.” However, Moscow’s initial plan was to take the capital and oust the government — a regime change operation.

​Based on flawed assumptions, Putin’s advisors anticipated that a war against Ukraine could be won in 3 days.

As the war dragged on, the Russian strategy pivoted its focus to the east and south. Russia now concentrates its strengths in artillery and aviation on a more limited geography, pursuing a “war of attrition” centered in Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Western Policy Response

The U.S. and 30 partners around the world imposed unprecedented sanctions and export controls to hold President Putin accountable for his war against Ukraine, restricting Russia's access to the critical technology it needs to fund its war machine, and turning Russia into a global financial pariah. For example, in the banking sector, several major Russian banks were blocked from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the messaging system used by 11,000 worldwide financial institutions globally to convey instructions to carry out tens of millions of transactions each day.  Independent decisions from the private sector accelerated these sanctions. Corporates engaged in “self-sanctioning”; with major firms including Ikea, Exxon, and BP voluntarily exiting the Russian market.

The European Union and US together have frozen over $300 billion of Russia’s Central Bank assets as sanctions for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Western military support for Ukraine also was unprecedented. To date, the US has sent approximately $7.3 billion in aid and arms to Ukraine, including High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), since Russia launched its attack on February 24, 2022. The U.S. continues to work with its allies and partners to identify and provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself. Importantly, Ukraine has officially been awarded EU-candidate status, moving the nation closer to its European partners.

Long-term Consequences

Despite the strength of Ukrainian and western responses, the results of the war are horrendous. As of July 3, 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Office said more than 14,000 people, including 5,000 civilians, have been killed in Ukraine since Russia invaded on February 24, adding that the real death toll is probably much higher. Additionally, as of July 13, 2022,  5,827,832 refugees from Ukraine have been recorded across Europe and 3,665,123 have registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

In addition to suffering the death and displacement of its people, Ukraine also faces economic freefall, has lost significant territory, and could take decades to rebuild its war-devastated infrastructure.

There are also global impacts from the war, including food insecurity as Ukraine’s grain from last year’s harvest awaits the opening of ports to deliver it, and this year’s grain goes unharvested. Millions of tons of grain needed to feed import-dependent countries in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere are sitting in Ukrainian storage sites, with food prices rising, while negotiators seek a solution to allow shipments. (Note: Immediately following SPF’s meeting, Turkish negotiators said an agreement had been brokered with Russia to allow Odessa’s port to be opened so that grain shipments could resume; however, as of July 19, shipments had not begun.)

Considering Russia

While Russia is perceived in the west as a global pariah because of its invasion of Ukraine, the consensus within Russia is to support the war. This may be due to censorship, the Kremlin’s control over the airwaves, and the resulting limited access by the Russian public to the realities occurring on the ground — and to the risks associated with dissent. The sanctions have not changed the core Russian decision to continue the war.

The Future: Potential Scenarios

Dr. Charap outlined four potential scenarios for the evolution of the conflict.

 

The Worst Case: The Military and/or Economic Collapse of Ukraine

Russia is currently using its peace-time army, but Putin has threatened additional mobilization of a bigger war machine. If western military support dries up, Ukraine would be vulnerable to military collapse. Some EU countries have divested their arsenals to help Ukraine, and even the U.S. will take years to replace the weapons it has donated. If the destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure accelerates, Ukraine could collapse economically.

 

Bad Scenario: Protracted Conflict

A less violent but continuing bombardment by Russia, with limited ongoing rocket attacks, would perhaps reduce the death and destruction but would keep Ukraine from rebuilding.

 

Possible Scenario: Armistice

This could resemble the solution in the Korean conflict, where the fighting stopped, an armistice was achieved, and a line was drawn dividing the territory, leaving the political challenges postponed. However, there is no clear stable line to draw in Ukraine like the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea; furthermore, Ukraine is not ready to give up the areas in the Donbas region it still holds and has launched a counter-offensive to reclaim the south territory currently occupied by the Russians.

 

Best Case Scenario: A Political Settlement

With such a settlement, the killing and destruction would stop; Ukrainian security requirements would have to be met; territorial issues would need to be resolved at least partially; and concessions would be made by both sides.

In late March, Ukrainian diplomats introduced an innovative framework that could provide a pathway out of the war that has already received at least preliminary support from both sides. At the center of the proposed deal is a trade: Kyiv would renounce its ambitions to join NATO and embrace permanent neutrality in return for receiving security guarantees from both its western partners and from Russia.

Unfortunately, this is an unlikely outcome as the Russian atrocities at Bucha and elsewhere in Ukraine have significantly dampened interest in negotiations.

In conclusion, Dr. Charap acknowledged that neither a Ukrainian nor a Russian victory is likely and a protracted war is a distinct possibility.

 

 

 

Discussion

​

Moderated by

Tom Finneran

 

Preston Baldwin
CenterPoint 360
Has this been a “Great Leap Backward” for Russia? What are the effects from Russian banks being banned from SWIFT and intellectual capital being lost as leaders defect from Russia? What is the potential impact on worldwide energy policy as winter approaches and energy demands increase, but Russian oil is boycotted?

Dr. Charap
Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
The sanctions, exodus of western corporations, and the inability to import technology have dramatically limited Russian economic growth, and a decline of 5-10% of GDP is likely. This will cause long-term challenges to its economic growth. The Russian economy will become more primitive, more isolated, and increasingly dependent on China. This is a picture of slow degradation of the economy rather than collapse. Russia still has some active economic levers and good macroeconomic policy-makers. However, it is not likely that they can maintain a healthy economy without connections to the outside world.

Economic pressures will also impact countries outside Russia, for example, EU countries could face energy rationing this winter. How long EU countries will endure high energy prices may affect future European decisions about Russia.

Sen. Matthew Huffman
President of the Senate, Ohio
Is it likely that Vladimir Putin will be removed from office?

Dr. Charap: No. To date, there have been no defections among the elite and no alternative leader is emerging. Russians are rallying behind the flag and, according to the opinion polling that is available, are mostly in favor of the war. However, Putin opened a Pandora’s Box with the Ukraine invasion undermining the core of his legitimacy. Over the long term, a disruption is possibly.

Sen. Bill Ferguson
President of the Senate, Maryland
Will Russia’s land grab in Ukraine encourage China to risk invading Taiwan?

Dr. Charap: There are significant differences. For example, while the U.S. has no formal commitment to Taiwan, there is an understanding that Washington would respond to any attempt to alter the status quo by force. There were no commitments at all with Ukraine. However, U.S. policy must consider the lesson that China might learn. If Russia was allowed its land grab without consequences, that could embolden China.

Furthermore, the conflict is driving the Russia-China relationship closer; how close will depend on how long the war lasts. A long war will make a Russia-west rapprochement more difficult, forcing a closer alliance with China. China will not make Russia’s struggle its own, but it is economically and politically supportive of Russia; it does not want Russia to lose. It will help solve the economic challenges in Russia, and already more Chinese firms are operating in Russia. This comes at a time when U.S.-China relations are tense, so China cannot afford to have any additional problems with Russia on its border.

Sen. Stephen Fenberg
President of the Senate, Colorado
What will be the consequences for Russia’s war crimes, and do the consequences depend on the outcome of the war? Will countries just move on and forget the crimes, or will there be ramifications?

Dr. Charap: There is a lot of documentation of war crimes, and these may be tried before the International Criminal Court or other multilateral courts. There will be no UN Security Council-authorized tribunal, because Russia has veto power there. There will likely be limits on the prosecution. We will not see senior Russian military leaders in the dock; however, Russia will have to pay a price for its atrocities, at the very least a reputational one.

Sen. Chuck Winder
Senate President Pro Tempore, Idaho
Could Ukraine take the war to Russia and inflict pain on the Russian people? Meanwhile, Russia’s threats against Sweden and Finland are destabilizing the whole area. Is Russia likely to use cyber-attacks? What about nuclear threats?

Dr. Charap: Ukraine does not have the long-range threat strike capability to move deeper into Russia beyond the border areas; however, it has been striking those border areas and having an impact on Russian supply lines.

Russian comments about Finland and Sweden joining NATO included warnings that Russia would respond in kind if NATO set up military infrastructure in those countries.

To date, Russia has not used cyber attacks against the West and likely would not want to open a new front in the war, as it is facing enough of a challenge on the Ukrainian front. Russia is bogged down in Ukraine and is using up significant conventional military resources.

Sen. Robert Stivers
President of the Senate, Kentucky
You have focused your conclusions on what is happening within Ukraine. What is the risk for expansion of the war beyond Ukraine?

Dr. Charap: We should be concerned about that possibility, whether due to an accidental event such as a missile going astray and hitting a NATO ally that borders Ukraine, or a deliberate Russian decision to target NATO countries. We have not seen any indication of this yet; however, if Russia starts to lose due to weapons that are coming from the West, the war could escalate. That is why President Biden has focused on maintaining vigilance to contain any risk to the allies.

Sen. Bart Hester
Senate President Pro Tempore, Arkansas
It’s harvest season in Ukraine, which accounts for 25% of the global wheat market.  What is happening with the harvest?

Dr. Charap: Reportedly, less than 20% of the stored grain from last year’s harvest can be delivered by means other than the blocked sea routes. Still, storage is full of last year’s grain, and this year’s grain is waiting to be harvested. UN-led negotiations in Turkey are seeking to unblock the exports. Turkey’s President Erdogan is in discussions with Putin to mediate.

Sen. Mimi Stewart
Senate President Pro Tempore, New Mexico
The Russian people are reported to be in favor of the war; however, they are not informed because of the censorship of the press in Russia. What can be done to get the facts out?

Dr. Charap: Polling during wartime in an authoritarian country is dubious at best, but there are some reliable polls that do show a majority of Russians support the war. Russia has a very limited, tightly controlled information space. Only about 12% of Russians read their news on the internet before the war. Currently, Russians are rallying around the flag — their sons and fathers also are dying.  The U.S. tries to provide alternate sources of information such as a modernized version of Radio Free Europe. Furthermore, You Tube has not been banned in Russia. However, breaking through is difficult.

Tom Finneran (Moderator): Regarding other countries’ relationships with Russia, where are the weak links? For example, India relies on Russia’s military industrial complex for its planes and submarines. India has structural constraints that prohibit it from breaking with Russia. It is  reticent to join in western sanctions against Russia and has taken an autonomous position in global politics.

Dr. Charap: There are a number of countries that are not aligned with the west about Russian aggression. India is not imposing sanctions on Russia and is buying more Russian oil. Turkey is often portrayed as doing Russia’s bidding; however, Ankara is just ruthlessly pursuing its interests.

Sen. Chuck Winder: How does India’s reliance on Russian military support impact its relationship with China?

Dr. Charap: Russia and China do not have the same positions on certain regional issues. They accept these differences as natural disagreements among great powers; they do not let these disputes undermine their cooperation. In the future, however, China may try to influence Russia’s military sales to its rivals, particularly India.

Presenter Biography

Samuel Charap, Ph

Senior Political Scientist
RAND Corporation

 

Samuel Charap is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include the foreign policies of Russia and the former Soviet states; European and Eurasian regional security; and U.S.-Russia deterrence, strategic stability, and arms control.

From November 2012 until April 2017, Charap was the senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the IISS, he served at the U.S. Department of State as senior advisor to the undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, covering Russia and Eurasia. From 2009 to 2011, Charap was director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American Progress.

Charap's book on the Ukraine crisis, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (coauthored with Timothy Colton), was published in January 2017. His articles have appeared in The Washington Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, Survival, Current History and several other journals.

Charap was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center and the International Center for Policy Studies (Kyiv), and a Fulbright Scholar at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He is fluent in Russian and proficient in Ukrainian. Charap holds a Ph.D. in political science and an M.Phil. in Russian and East European studies from the University of Oxford, where he was a Marshall Scholar. He received his B.A. in Russian and political science from Amherst College. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Full bio

 

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​Statistics concerning Ukrainian refugees are tracked and regularly updated by the UN at the following linkOperational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation

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The Crisis in Ukraine:
Implications at Home and Abroad

​​Samuel Charap, PhDSenior Political Scientist
RAND Corporation

 

The immediate past and potential future scenarios for the Russia-Ukraine War were discussed by Samuel Charap, PhD, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He reviewed the reasons why Russia initiated its war of aggression against Ukraine and why Russia’s early initiatives faltered. He assessed the Western response to the invasion and provided a variety of potential outcomes for the war.

A Brief History of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Dr. Charap pointed out that the underlying factors precipitating the conflict can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse. However, 2014 marked a watershed moment, when relatively Russia friendly President Viktor Yanukovych rejected the option for greater integration with the European Union. This led to uprisings against his democratically elected but authoritarian regime that were violently suppressed. However, the anti-government protests ultimately toppled the government, forcing the President to flee and enabling the transition to a Russia-skeptical, Western-leaning government.

In an attempt to ensure its influence over Ukraine, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and supported pro-Russia separatist rebels who began seizing territory in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Fighting between the rebels and the Ukrainian military intensified, the rebels started losing, and, in August 2014, the Russian army overtly invaded eastern Ukraine to support the rebels.

The Minsk Agreements of 2014 and 2015 sought to end the conflict. Under the agreements, Russia would return control of the Donbas region to Ukraine in exchange for levers of influence over Ukraine’s future. The agreements were never realized. By 2021, Moscow had lost any prospect of achieving its objectives through the Minsk process.

Recent Developments

By late Fall 2021, 150,000 Russian troops amassed on the Ukrainian border. But Russian planning was being conducted in secret by a few of Putin’s advisors. Even the Russian troops and their leaders believed this was to be a military exercise until orders to invade were issued, and a chaotic Russian invasion began. Despite Russia’s military advantage, they did not effectively execute a coherent strategy, allowing Ukraine troops to score significant early victories.

The Ukraine military and civilian resistance were more resilient than Russian intelligence had presumed. Based on flawed assumptions, Putin’s advisors anticipated that a war against Ukraine could be won in 3 days, that the Ukraine army and the government leaders would flee, and that Russian soldiers would be “greeted with flowers.” The Kremlin justified its decision to launch the war — which it calls a “special military operation” — by saying it was protecting Russian speakers who live in the Donbas region from “genocide.” However, Moscow’s initial plan was to take the capital and oust the government — a regime change operation.

​Based on flawed assumptions, Putin’s advisors anticipated that a war against Ukraine could be won in 3 days.

As the war dragged on, the Russian strategy pivoted its focus to the east and south. Russia now concentrates its strengths in artillery and aviation on a more limited geography, pursuing a “war of attrition” centered in Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Western Policy Response

The U.S. and 30 partners around the world imposed unprecedented sanctions and export controls to hold President Putin accountable for his war against Ukraine, restricting Russia's access to the critical technology it needs to fund its war machine, and turning Russia into a global financial pariah. For example, in the banking sector, several major Russian banks were blocked from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the messaging system used by 11,000 worldwide financial institutions globally to convey instructions to carry out tens of millions of transactions each day.  Independent decisions from the private sector accelerated these sanctions. Corporates engaged in “self-sanctioning”; with major firms including Ikea, Exxon, and BP voluntarily exiting the Russian market.

The European Union and US together have frozen over $300 billion of Russia’s Central Bank assets as sanctions for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Western military support for Ukraine also was unprecedented. To date, the US has sent approximately $7.3 billion in aid and arms to Ukraine, including High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), since Russia launched its attack on February 24, 2022. The U.S. continues to work with its allies and partners to identify and provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself. Importantly, Ukraine has officially been awarded EU-candidate status, moving the nation closer to its European partners.

Long-term Consequences

Despite the strength of Ukrainian and western responses, the results of the war are horrendous. As of July 3, 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Office said more than 14,000 people, including 5,000 civilians, have been killed in Ukraine since Russia invaded on February 24, adding that the real death toll is probably much higher. Additionally, as of July 13, 2022,  5,827,832 refugees from Ukraine have been recorded across Europe and 3,665,123 have registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

 

​Statistics concerning Ukrainian refugees are tracked and regularly updated by the UN at the following linkOperational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation

 

In addition to suffering the death and displacement of its people, Ukraine also faces economic freefall, has lost significant territory, and could take decades to rebuild its war-devastated infrastructure.

There are also global impacts from the war, including food insecurity as Ukraine’s grain from last year’s harvest awaits the opening of ports to deliver it, and this year’s grain goes unharvested. Millions of tons of grain needed to feed import-dependent countries in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere are sitting in Ukrainian storage sites, with food prices rising, while negotiators seek a solution to allow shipments. (Note: Immediately following SPF’s meeting, Turkish negotiators said an agreement had been brokered with Russia to allow Odessa’s port to be opened so that grain shipments could resume; however, as of July 19, shipments had not begun.)

Considering Russia

While Russia is perceived in the west as a global pariah because of its invasion of Ukraine, the consensus within Russia is to support the war. This may be due to censorship, the Kremlin’s control over the airwaves, and the resulting limited access by the Russian public to the realities occurring on the ground — and to the risks associated with dissent. The sanctions have not changed the core Russian decision to continue the war.

The Future: Potential Scenarios

Dr. Charap outlined four potential scenarios for the evolution of the conflict.

 

The Worst Case: The Military and/or Economic Collapse of Ukraine

Russia is currently using its peace-time army, but Putin has threatened additional mobilization of a bigger war machine. If western military support dries up, Ukraine would be vulnerable to military collapse. Some EU countries have divested their arsenals to help Ukraine, and even the U.S. will take years to replace the weapons it has donated. If the destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure accelerates, Ukraine could collapse economically.

 

Bad Scenario: Protracted Conflict

A less violent but continuing bombardment by Russia, with limited ongoing rocket attacks, would perhaps reduce the death and destruction but would keep Ukraine from rebuilding.

 

Possible Scenario: Armistice

This could resemble the solution in the Korean conflict, where the fighting stopped, an armistice was achieved, and a line was drawn dividing the territory, leaving the political challenges postponed. However, there is no clear stable line to draw in Ukraine like the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea; furthermore, Ukraine is not ready to give up the areas in the Donbas region it still holds and has launched a counter-offensive to reclaim the south territory currently occupied by the Russians.

 

Best Case Scenario: A Political Settlement

With such a settlement, the killing and destruction would stop; Ukrainian security requirements would have to be met; territorial issues would need to be resolved at least partially; and concessions would be made by both sides.

In late March, Ukrainian diplomats introduced an innovative framework that could provide a pathway out of the war that has already received at least preliminary support from both sides. At the center of the proposed deal is a trade: Kyiv would renounce its ambitions to join NATO and embrace permanent neutrality in return for receiving security guarantees from both its western partners and from Russia.

Unfortunately, this is an unlikely outcome as the Russian atrocities at Bucha and elsewhere in Ukraine have significantly dampened interest in negotiations.

In conclusion, Dr. Charap acknowledged that neither a Ukrainian nor a Russian victory is likely and a protracted war is a distinct possibility.

 

 

 

Discussion

​

Moderated by

Tom Finneran

 

Preston Baldwin
CenterPoint 360
Has this been a “Great Leap Backward” for Russia? What are the effects from Russian banks being banned from SWIFT and intellectual capital being lost as leaders defect from Russia? What is the potential impact on worldwide energy policy as winter approaches and energy demands increase, but Russian oil is boycotted?

Dr. Charap
Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
The sanctions, exodus of western corporations, and the inability to import technology have dramatically limited Russian economic growth, and a decline of 5-10% of GDP is likely. This will cause long-term challenges to its economic growth. The Russian economy will become more primitive, more isolated, and increasingly dependent on China. This is a picture of slow degradation of the economy rather than collapse. Russia still has some active economic levers and good macroeconomic policy-makers. However, it is not likely that they can maintain a healthy economy without connections to the outside world.

Economic pressures will also impact countries outside Russia, for example, EU countries could face energy rationing this winter. How long EU countries will endure high energy prices may affect future European decisions about Russia.

Sen. Matthew Huffman
President of the Senate, Ohio
Is it likely that Vladimir Putin will be removed from office?

Dr. Charap: No. To date, there have been no defections among the elite and no alternative leader is emerging. Russians are rallying behind the flag and, according to the opinion polling that is available, are mostly in favor of the war. However, Putin opened a Pandora’s Box with the Ukraine invasion undermining the core of his legitimacy. Over the long term, a disruption is possibly.

Sen. Bill Ferguson
President of the Senate, Maryland
Will Russia’s land grab in Ukraine encourage China to risk invading Taiwan?

Dr. Charap: There are significant differences. For example, while the U.S. has no formal commitment to Taiwan, there is an understanding that Washington would respond to any attempt to alter the status quo by force. There were no commitments at all with Ukraine. However, U.S. policy must consider the lesson that China might learn. If Russia was allowed its land grab without consequences, that could embolden China.

Furthermore, the conflict is driving the Russia-China relationship closer; how close will depend on how long the war lasts. A long war will make a Russia-west rapprochement more difficult, forcing a closer alliance with China. China will not make Russia’s struggle its own, but it is economically and politically supportive of Russia; it does not want Russia to lose. It will help solve the economic challenges in Russia, and already more Chinese firms are operating in Russia. This comes at a time when U.S.-China relations are tense, so China cannot afford to have any additional problems with Russia on its border.

Sen. Stephen Fenberg
President of the Senate, Colorado
What will be the consequences for Russia’s war crimes, and do the consequences depend on the outcome of the war? Will countries just move on and forget the crimes, or will there be ramifications?

Dr. Charap: There is a lot of documentation of war crimes, and these may be tried before the International Criminal Court or other multilateral courts. There will be no UN Security Council-authorized tribunal, because Russia has veto power there. There will likely be limits on the prosecution. We will not see senior Russian military leaders in the dock; however, Russia will have to pay a price for its atrocities, at the very least a reputational one.

Sen. Chuck Winder
Senate President Pro Tempore, Idaho
Could Ukraine take the war to Russia and inflict pain on the Russian people? Meanwhile, Russia’s threats against Sweden and Finland are destabilizing the whole area. Is Russia likely to use cyber-attacks? What about nuclear threats?

Dr. Charap: Ukraine does not have the long-range threat strike capability to move deeper into Russia beyond the border areas; however, it has been striking those border areas and having an impact on Russian supply lines.

Russian comments about Finland and Sweden joining NATO included warnings that Russia would respond in kind if NATO set up military infrastructure in those countries.

To date, Russia has not used cyber attacks against the West and likely would not want to open a new front in the war, as it is facing enough of a challenge on the Ukrainian front. Russia is bogged down in Ukraine and is using up significant conventional military resources.

Sen. Robert Stivers
President of the Senate, Kentucky
You have focused your conclusions on what is happening within Ukraine. What is the risk for expansion of the war beyond Ukraine?

Dr. Charap: We should be concerned about that possibility, whether due to an accidental event such as a missile going astray and hitting a NATO ally that borders Ukraine, or a deliberate Russian decision to target NATO countries. We have not seen any indication of this yet; however, if Russia starts to lose due to weapons that are coming from the West, the war could escalate. That is why President Biden has focused on maintaining vigilance to contain any risk to the allies.

Sen. Bart Hester
Senate President Pro Tempore, Arkansas
It’s harvest season in Ukraine, which accounts for 25% of the global wheat market.  What is happening with the harvest?

Dr. Charap: Reportedly, less than 20% of the stored grain from last year’s harvest can be delivered by means other than the blocked sea routes. Still, storage is full of last year’s grain, and this year’s grain is waiting to be harvested. UN-led negotiations in Turkey are seeking to unblock the exports. Turkey’s President Erdogan is in discussions with Putin to mediate.

Sen. Mimi Stewart
Senate President Pro Tempore, New Mexico
The Russian people are reported to be in favor of the war; however, they are not informed because of the censorship of the press in Russia. What can be done to get the facts out?

Dr. Charap: Polling during wartime in an authoritarian country is dubious at best, but there are some reliable polls that do show a majority of Russians support the war. Russia has a very limited, tightly controlled information space. Only about 12% of Russians read their news on the internet before the war. Currently, Russians are rallying around the flag — their sons and fathers also are dying.  The U.S. tries to provide alternate sources of information such as a modernized version of Radio Free Europe. Furthermore, You Tube has not been banned in Russia. However, breaking through is difficult.

Tom Finneran (Moderator): Regarding other countries’ relationships with Russia, where are the weak links? For example, India relies on Russia’s military industrial complex for its planes and submarines. India has structural constraints that prohibit it from breaking with Russia. It is  reticent to join in western sanctions against Russia and has taken an autonomous position in global politics.

Dr. Charap: There are a number of countries that are not aligned with the west about Russian aggression. India is not imposing sanctions on Russia and is buying more Russian oil. Turkey is often portrayed as doing Russia’s bidding; however, Ankara is just ruthlessly pursuing its interests.

Sen. Chuck Winder: How does India’s reliance on Russian military support impact its relationship with China?

Dr. Charap: Russia and China do not have the same positions on certain regional issues. They accept these differences as natural disagreements among great powers; they do not let these disputes undermine their cooperation. In the future, however, China may try to influence Russia’s military sales to its rivals, particularly India.

Presenter Biography

Samuel Charap, Ph

Senior Political Scientist
RAND Corporation

 

Samuel Charap is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include the foreign policies of Russia and the former Soviet states; European and Eurasian regional security; and U.S.-Russia deterrence, strategic stability, and arms control.

From November 2012 until April 2017, Charap was the senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the IISS, he served at the U.S. Department of State as senior advisor to the undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, covering Russia and Eurasia. From 2009 to 2011, Charap was director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American Progress.

Charap's book on the Ukraine crisis, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (coauthored with Timothy Colton), was published in January 2017. His articles have appeared in The Washington Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, Survival, Current History and several other journals.

Charap was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center and the International Center for Policy Studies (Kyiv), and a Fulbright Scholar at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He is fluent in Russian and proficient in Ukrainian. Charap holds a Ph.D. in political science and an M.Phil. in Russian and East European studies from the University of Oxford, where he was a Marshall Scholar. He received his B.A. in Russian and political science from Amherst College. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Copyright © 2022 Senate Presidents' Forum. All rights reserved.

The Crisis in Ukraine:
Implications at Home and Abroad

​​Samuel Charap, PhDSenior Political Scientist
RAND Corporation

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The immediate past and potential future scenarios for the Russia-Ukraine War were discussed by Samuel Charap, PhD, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He reviewed the reasons why Russia initiated its war of aggression against Ukraine and why Russia’s early initiatives faltered. He assessed the Western response to the invasion and provided a variety of potential outcomes for the war.

A Brief History of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Dr. Charap pointed out that the underlying factors precipitating the conflict can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse. However, 2014 marked a watershed moment, when relatively Russia friendly President Viktor Yanukovych rejected the option for greater integration with the European Union. This led to uprisings against his democratically elected but authoritarian regime that were violently suppressed. However, the anti-government protests ultimately toppled the government, forcing the President to flee and enabling the transition to a Russia-skeptical, Western-leaning government.

In an attempt to ensure its influence over Ukraine, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and supported pro-Russia separatist rebels who began seizing territory in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Fighting between the rebels and the Ukrainian military intensified, the rebels started losing, and, in August 2014, the Russian army overtly invaded eastern Ukraine to support the rebels.

The Minsk Agreements of 2014 and 2015 sought to end the conflict. Under the agreements, Russia would return control of the Donbas region to Ukraine in exchange for levers of influence over Ukraine’s future. The agreements were never realized. By 2021, Moscow had lost any prospect of achieving its objectives through the Minsk process.

Recent Developments

By late Fall 2021, 150,000 Russian troops amassed on the Ukrainian border. But Russian planning was being conducted in secret by a few of Putin’s advisors. Even the Russian troops and their leaders believed this was to be a military exercise until orders to invade were issued, and a chaotic Russian invasion began. Despite Russia’s military advantage, they did not effectively execute a coherent strategy, allowing Ukraine troops to score significant early victories.

The Ukraine military and civilian resistance were more resilient than Russian intelligence had presumed. Based on flawed assumptions, Putin’s advisors anticipated that a war against Ukraine could be won in 3 days, that the Ukraine army and the government leaders would flee, and that Russian soldiers would be “greeted with flowers.” The Kremlin justified its decision to launch the war — which it calls a “special military operation” — by saying it was protecting Russian speakers who live in the Donbas region from “genocide.” However, Moscow’s initial plan was to take the capital and oust the government — a regime change operation.

​Based on flawed assumptions, Putin’s advisors anticipated that a war against Ukraine could be won in 3 days.

As the war dragged on, the Russian strategy pivoted its focus to the east and south. Russia now concentrates its strengths in artillery and aviation on a more limited geography, pursuing a “war of attrition” centered in Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Western Policy Response

The U.S. and 30 partners around the world imposed unprecedented sanctions and export controls to hold President Putin accountable for his war against Ukraine, restricting Russia's access to the critical technology it needs to fund its war machine, and turning Russia into a global financial pariah. For example, in the banking sector, several major Russian banks were blocked from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the messaging system used by 11,000 worldwide financial institutions globally to convey instructions to carry out tens of millions of transactions each day.  Independent decisions from the private sector accelerated these sanctions. Corporates engaged in “self-sanctioning”; with major firms including Ikea, Exxon, and BP voluntarily exiting the Russian market.

The European Union and US together have frozen over $300 billion of Russia’s Central Bank assets as sanctions for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Western military support for Ukraine also was unprecedented. To date, the US has sent approximately $7.3 billion in aid and arms to Ukraine, including High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), since Russia launched its attack on February 24, 2022. The U.S. continues to work with its allies and partners to identify and provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself. Importantly, Ukraine has officially been awarded EU-candidate status, moving the nation closer to its European partners.

Long-term Consequences

Despite the strength of Ukrainian and western responses, the results of the war are horrendous. As of July 3, 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Office said more than 14,000 people, including 5,000 civilians, have been killed in Ukraine since Russia invaded on February 24, adding that the real death toll is probably much higher. Additionally, as of July 13, 2022,  5,827,832 refugees from Ukraine have been recorded across Europe and 3,665,123 have registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

 

​Statistics concerning Ukrainian refugees are tracked and regularly updated by the UN at the following linkOperational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation

 

In addition to suffering the death and displacement of its people, Ukraine also faces economic freefall, has lost significant territory, and could take decades to rebuild its war-devastated infrastructure.

There are also global impacts from the war, including food insecurity as Ukraine’s grain from last year’s harvest awaits the opening of ports to deliver it, and this year’s grain goes unharvested. Millions of tons of grain needed to feed import-dependent countries in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere are sitting in Ukrainian storage sites, with food prices rising, while negotiators seek a solution to allow shipments. (Note: Immediately following SPF’s meeting, Turkish negotiators said an agreement had been brokered with Russia to allow Odessa’s port to be opened so that grain shipments could resume; however, as of July 19, shipments had not begun.)

Considering Russia

While Russia is perceived in the west as a global pariah because of its invasion of Ukraine, the consensus within Russia is to support the war. This may be due to censorship, the Kremlin’s control over the airwaves, and the resulting limited access by the Russian public to the realities occurring on the ground — and to the risks associated with dissent. The sanctions have not changed the core Russian decision to continue the war.

The Future: Potential Scenarios

Dr. Charap outlined four potential scenarios for the evolution of the conflict.

 

The Worst Case: The Military and/or Economic Collapse of Ukraine

Russia is currently using its peace-time army, but Putin has threatened additional mobilization of a bigger war machine. If western military support dries up, Ukraine would be vulnerable to military collapse. Some EU countries have divested their arsenals to help Ukraine, and even the U.S. will take years to replace the weapons it has donated. If the destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure accelerates, Ukraine could collapse economically.

 

Bad Scenario: Protracted Conflict

A less violent but continuing bombardment by Russia, with limited ongoing rocket attacks, would perhaps reduce the death and destruction but would keep Ukraine from rebuilding.

 

Possible Scenario: Armistice

This could resemble the solution in the Korean conflict, where the fighting stopped, an armistice was achieved, and a line was drawn dividing the territory, leaving the political challenges postponed. However, there is no clear stable line to draw in Ukraine like the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea; furthermore, Ukraine is not ready to give up the areas in the Donbas region it still holds and has launched a counter-offensive to reclaim the south territory currently occupied by the Russians.

 

Best Case Scenario: A Political Settlement

With such a settlement, the killing and destruction would stop; Ukrainian security requirements would have to be met; territorial issues would need to be resolved at least partially; and concessions would be made by both sides.

In late March, Ukrainian diplomats introduced an innovative framework that could provide a pathway out of the war that has already received at least preliminary support from both sides. At the center of the proposed deal is a trade: Kyiv would renounce its ambitions to join NATO and embrace permanent neutrality in return for receiving security guarantees from both its western partners and from Russia.

Unfortunately, this is an unlikely outcome as the Russian atrocities at Bucha and elsewhere in Ukraine have significantly dampened interest in negotiations.

In conclusion, Dr. Charap acknowledged that neither a Ukrainian nor a Russian victory is likely and a protracted war is a distinct possibility.

 

 

 

Discussion

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Moderated by

Tom Finneran

 

Preston Baldwin
CenterPoint 360
Has this been a “Great Leap Backward” for Russia? What are the effects from Russian banks being banned from SWIFT and intellectual capital being lost as leaders defect from Russia? What is the potential impact on worldwide energy policy as winter approaches and energy demands increase, but Russian oil is boycotted?

Dr. Charap
Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
The sanctions, exodus of western corporations, and the inability to import technology have dramatically limited Russian economic growth, and a decline of 5-10% of GDP is likely. This will cause long-term challenges to its economic growth. The Russian economy will become more primitive, more isolated, and increasingly dependent on China. This is a picture of slow degradation of the economy rather than collapse. Russia still has some active economic levers and good macroeconomic policy-makers. However, it is not likely that they can maintain a healthy economy without connections to the outside world.

Economic pressures will also impact countries outside Russia, for example, EU countries could face energy rationing this winter. How long EU countries will endure high energy prices may affect future European decisions about Russia.

Sen. Matthew Huffman
President of the Senate, Ohio
Is it likely that Vladimir Putin will be removed from office?

Dr. Charap: No. To date, there have been no defections among the elite and no alternative leader is emerging. Russians are rallying behind the flag and, according to the opinion polling that is available, are mostly in favor of the war. However, Putin opened a Pandora’s Box with the Ukraine invasion undermining the core of his legitimacy. Over the long term, a disruption is possibly.

Sen. Bill Ferguson
President of the Senate, Maryland
Will Russia’s land grab in Ukraine encourage China to risk invading Taiwan?

Dr. Charap: There are significant differences. For example, while the U.S. has no formal commitment to Taiwan, there is an understanding that Washington would respond to any attempt to alter the status quo by force. There were no commitments at all with Ukraine. However, U.S. policy must consider the lesson that China might learn. If Russia was allowed its land grab without consequences, that could embolden China.

Furthermore, the conflict is driving the Russia-China relationship closer; how close will depend on how long the war lasts. A long war will make a Russia-west rapprochement more difficult, forcing a closer alliance with China. China will not make Russia’s struggle its own, but it is economically and politically supportive of Russia; it does not want Russia to lose. It will help solve the economic challenges in Russia, and already more Chinese firms are operating in Russia. This comes at a time when U.S.-China relations are tense, so China cannot afford to have any additional problems with Russia on its border.

Sen. Stephen Fenberg
President of the Senate, Colorado
What will be the consequences for Russia’s war crimes, and do the consequences depend on the outcome of the war? Will countries just move on and forget the crimes, or will there be ramifications?

Dr. Charap: There is a lot of documentation of war crimes, and these may be tried before the International Criminal Court or other multilateral courts. There will be no UN Security Council-authorized tribunal, because Russia has veto power there. There will likely be limits on the prosecution. We will not see senior Russian military leaders in the dock; however, Russia will have to pay a price for its atrocities, at the very least a reputational one.

Sen. Chuck Winder
Senate President Pro Tempore, Idaho
Could Ukraine take the war to Russia and inflict pain on the Russian people? Meanwhile, Russia’s threats against Sweden and Finland are destabilizing the whole area. Is Russia likely to use cyber-attacks? What about nuclear threats?

Dr. Charap: Ukraine does not have the long-range threat strike capability to move deeper into Russia beyond the border areas; however, it has been striking those border areas and having an impact on Russian supply lines.

Russian comments about Finland and Sweden joining NATO included warnings that Russia would respond in kind if NATO set up military infrastructure in those countries.

To date, Russia has not used cyber attacks against the West and likely would not want to open a new front in the war, as it is facing enough of a challenge on the Ukrainian front. Russia is bogged down in Ukraine and is using up significant conventional military resources.

Sen. Robert Stivers
President of the Senate, Kentucky
You have focused your conclusions on what is happening within Ukraine. What is the risk for expansion of the war beyond Ukraine?

Dr. Charap: We should be concerned about that possibility, whether due to an accidental event such as a missile going astray and hitting a NATO ally that borders Ukraine, or a deliberate Russian decision to target NATO countries. We have not seen any indication of this yet; however, if Russia starts to lose due to weapons that are coming from the West, the war could escalate. That is why President Biden has focused on maintaining vigilance to contain any risk to the allies.

Sen. Bart Hester
Senate President Pro Tempore, Arkansas
It’s harvest season in Ukraine, which accounts for 25% of the global wheat market.  What is happening with the harvest?

Dr. Charap: Reportedly, less than 20% of the stored grain from last year’s harvest can be delivered by means other than the blocked sea routes. Still, storage is full of last year’s grain, and this year’s grain is waiting to be harvested. UN-led negotiations in Turkey are seeking to unblock the exports. Turkey’s President Erdogan is in discussions with Putin to mediate.

Sen. Mimi Stewart
Senate President Pro Tempore, New Mexico
The Russian people are reported to be in favor of the war; however, they are not informed because of the censorship of the press in Russia. What can be done to get the facts out?

Dr. Charap: Polling during wartime in an authoritarian country is dubious at best, but there are some reliable polls that do show a majority of Russians support the war. Russia has a very limited, tightly controlled information space. Only about 12% of Russians read their news on the internet before the war. Currently, Russians are rallying around the flag — their sons and fathers also are dying.  The U.S. tries to provide alternate sources of information such as a modernized version of Radio Free Europe. Furthermore, You Tube has not been banned in Russia. However, breaking through is difficult.

Tom Finneran (Moderator): Regarding other countries’ relationships with Russia, where are the weak links? For example, India relies on Russia’s military industrial complex for its planes and submarines. India has structural constraints that prohibit it from breaking with Russia. It is  reticent to join in western sanctions against Russia and has taken an autonomous position in global politics.

Dr. Charap: There are a number of countries that are not aligned with the west about Russian aggression. India is not imposing sanctions on Russia and is buying more Russian oil. Turkey is often portrayed as doing Russia’s bidding; however, Ankara is just ruthlessly pursuing its interests.

Sen. Chuck Winder: How does India’s reliance on Russian military support impact its relationship with China?

Dr. Charap: Russia and China do not have the same positions on certain regional issues. They accept these differences as natural disagreements among great powers; they do not let these disputes undermine their cooperation. In the future, however, China may try to influence Russia’s military sales to its rivals, particularly India.

Presenter Biography

Samuel Charap, Ph

Senior Political Scientist
RAND Corporation

 

Samuel Charap is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include the foreign policies of Russia and the former Soviet states; European and Eurasian regional security; and U.S.-Russia deterrence, strategic stability, and arms control.

From November 2012 until April 2017, Charap was the senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the IISS, he served at the U.S. Department of State as senior advisor to the undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, covering Russia and Eurasia. From 2009 to 2011, Charap was director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American Progress.

Charap's book on the Ukraine crisis, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (coauthored with Timothy Colton), was published in January 2017. His articles have appeared in The Washington Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, Survival, Current History and several other journals.

Charap was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center and the International Center for Policy Studies (Kyiv), and a Fulbright Scholar at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He is fluent in Russian and proficient in Ukrainian. Charap holds a Ph.D. in political science and an M.Phil. in Russian and East European studies from the University of Oxford, where he was a Marshall Scholar. He received his B.A. in Russian and political science from Amherst College. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Full bio

 

​

CONTACT US

Senate Presidents’ Forum

579 Broadway

Hastings-on-Hudson, NY 10706

914-693-1818   •   info@senpf.com

​

Copyright © 2022 Senate Presidents' Forum. All rights reserved.